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Introduction	
According	to	many	historical	philosophical	figures,	knowledge	must	be	based	on	infallible	
foundations.	These	foundations	have	been	characterized	in	different	ways;	e.g.,	as	“cognitive	
impressions”	by	the	ancient	Stoics,	as	“clear	and	distinct	perceptions”	by	Descartes,	and	as	“the	
given”	element	in	experience	by	C.	I.	Lewis	and	other	twentieth-century	philosophers	(Reed	2012:	
585).	In	each	case,	it	has	been	assumed	that	these	foundations	are	infallible	in	that	they	preclude	
error	on	the	part	of	the	knower.	To	have	knowledge,	in	other	words,	we	must	have	justification	that	
guarantees	that	our	belief	is	true.1	This	is	infallibilism.	It	is	the	view	that	knowledge	demands	the	
highest	degree	of	justification.		
In	contemporary	epistemology,	it	is	widely	accepted	that	infallibilist	theories	of	knowledge	are	
“doomed	to	a	skeptical	conclusion”	(Cohen	1988:	91).2	We	humans	are	fallible	creatures	that	can	
rarely	guarantee	the	truth	of	our	beliefs;	indeed,	almost	no	belief	can	be	rationally	supported	or	
justified	in	a	way	that	removes	all	possible	doubt.	By	demanding	infallibility,	we	would	prevent	
ourselves	from	knowing	almost	anything.	This	is	an	unwelcome	skeptical	result.		
To	avoid	skepticism,	many	contemporary	epistemologists	endorse	a	fallibilist	view	of	knowledge.	A	
fallibilist	believes	that	we	can	know	things	on	the	basis	of	justification	that	is	less	than	fully	
conclusive.	As	Jim	Pryor	says,	“a	fallibilist	is	someone	who	believes	that	we	can	have	knowledge	on	
the	basis	of	defeasible	justification,	justification	that	does	not	guarantee	that	our	beliefs	are	correct”	
(2000:	518).	This	view	is	attractive	because	it	allegedly	avoids	the	skeptical	consequences	of	
infallibilist	conceptions	of	knowledge.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	fallibilism	is	typically	regarded	as	the	
only	serious	option	in	epistemology.	As	Harvey	Siegel	says,	“we	are	all	fallibilists	now”	(1997:	164).3		
																																								 																				
1	I	will	use	‘justification’	broadly	to	include	the	related	notions	of	‘evidence’,	‘probability’,	‘warrant’,	and	‘reliability’.	
2	Some	have	denied	that	infallibilism	must	lead	to	skepticism.	For	example,	Fred	Dretske	(1981),	Timothy	Williamson	
(2000),	Wayne	Davis	(2007),	and	Ram	Neta	(2011)	each	defend	a	version	of	infallibilism	that	allegedly	has	non-skeptical	
results.	If	these	authors	are	right,	then	the	step	from	infallibilism	to	skepticism	is	not	an	inevitable	one.	In	contrast,	Brown	
(2018)	argues	that	infallibilists	can	avoid	skepticism	only	at	the	cost	of	problematic	commitments	concerning	evidence	and	
evidential	support.	However,	my	focus	in	this	chapter	is	not	on	whether	infallibilism	leads	to	skepticism,	so	I	will	set	this	
issue	aside.			
3	Michael	Williams	agrees:	“We	are	all	fallibilists	nowadays”	(2001:	5).	And	Stewart	Cohen	says,	“the	acceptance	of	
fallibilism	in	epistemology	is	virtually	universal”	(1988:	91).	But	not	all	philosophers	are	fallibilists;	for	example,	Peter	Unger	
(1975)	and	Laurence	BonJour	(2010)	are	willing	to	accept	the	skeptical	consequences	of	their	infallibilist	views.	
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Although	fallibilism	is	almost	universally	accepted	in	epistemology,	the	nature	of	fallibilist	knowledge	
is	still	poorly	understood.	There	are	at	least	two	reasons	for	this.	First,	it	is	unclear	how	to	formulate	
fallibilism	precisely.4	Second,	it	is	surprisingly	difficult	to	describe	the	level	of	fallible	justification	
required	for	knowledge	in	a	clear	and	non-arbitrary	way.5	Despite	this	lack	of	precision,	however,	it	
is	clear	that	contemporary	fallibilists	typically	endorse	the	following	two	claims:	first,	knowledge	is	
compatible	with	our	cognitive	fallibilities	as	inquirers;	second,	we	typically	meet	the	level	of	
justification	required	for	knowledge.	In	other	words,	fallibilists	are	not	usually	skeptics.	As	Stephen	
Hetherington	writes	in	his	encyclopaedia	entry	on	fallibilism,		
it	is	fallibilist	epistemologists	(which	is	to	say,	the	majority	of	epistemologists)	who	tend	not	to	be	
skeptics	.	.	.	Generally,	those	epistemologists	see	themselves	as	thinking	about	knowledge	and	
justification	in	a	comparatively	realistic	way	—	by	recognizing	the	fallibilist	realities	of	human	cognitive	
capacities,	even	while	accommodating	those	fallibilities	within	a	theory	that	allows	perpetually	fallible	
people	to	have	knowledge	and	justified	beliefs.	(Hetherington	2019)	
But	fallibilism	does	not	necessarily	escape	skepticism.	A	theory	might	be	fallibilist	while	still	
espousing	standards	too	demanding	to	be	regularly	met.	In	other	words,	it	is	coherent	to	be	both	a	
fallibilist	and	a	skeptic.	A	‘fallibilist	skeptic’	is	someone	who	endorses	the	following	two	theses:	first,	
the	level	of	justification	required	for	knowledge	is	“less	than	fully	conclusive”,	so	we	need	not	
guarantee	the	truth	of	our	beliefs	to	have	knowledge	(i.e.	fallibilism);	second,	many	of	our	ordinary	
knowledge	claims	are	nevertheless	false	(i.e.	skepticism).		
This	might	seem	like	a	puzzling	combination	of	ideas.	In	contemporary	epistemology,	fallibilism	and	
skepticism	are	often	depicted	as	opposing	views:	we	embrace	to	fallibilism	to	escape	skepticism,	and	
to	deny	fallibilism	is	to	risk	skepticism.	However,	fallibilism	alone	does	not	guarantee	that	most	of	
our	ordinary	knowledge	claims	are	true.	In	this	paper,	I	will	defend	a	version	of	skepticism	that	is	
compatible	with	fallibilism	and	supported	by	recent	work	in	psychology.	In	particular,	I	will	argue	
that	we	often	cannot	properly	trust	our	ability	to	rationally	evaluate	reasons,	arguments,	and	
evidence	(a	fundamental	knowledge-seeking	faculty).	We	humans	are	just	too	cognitively	impaired	
to	achieve	even	fallible	knowledge,	at	least	for	many	beliefs.	
	
High-standards	Skepticism	
Fallibilists	often	complain	that	skeptics	wrongly	impose	impossibly	high	standards	for	knowledge.	
The	skeptic	claims,	for	instance,	that	knowledge	requires	one	to	be	absolutely	certain	and	that	
																																								 																				
4	See	Reed	(2002)	and	Brown	(2018)	for	a	discussion.		
5	BonJour	(2010)	makes	this	objection.	See	Hetherington	(2006)	and	Hannon	(2017)	for	replies.		
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absolute	certainty	is	impossible	or	rare	(see	Unger	1975).6	This	view	demands	that	we	justify	our	
beliefs	to	the	highest	possible	degree.	I	will	therefore	call	it	‘high-standards	skepticism’.		
Descartes	seems	to	endorse	a	version	of	high-standards	skepticism	in	the	Meditations.	He	writes:		
Reason	now	leads	me	to	think	I	should	hold	back	my	assent	from	opinions	which	are	not	completely	
certain	and	indubitable	just	as	carefully	as	I	do	from	those	which	are	patently	false.	So,	for	the	purpose	
of	rejecting	all	my	opinions,	it	will	be	enough	if	I	find	in	each	of	them	at	least	some	reason	for	doubt.	
(Descartes	1998:	59)	
Scholars	often	interpret	Descartes	as	endorsing	the	following	idea:	the	bar	for	knowledge	is	set	so	
high	as	to	demand	infallibility	or	absolute	certainty.	We	also	find	this	idea	in	Descartes’	Rules	for	the	
Direction	of	the	Mind,	where	he	writes:	“All	knowledge	is	certain	and	evident	cognition”.	Although	
Descartes	was	himself	not	a	skeptic,	he	seems	to	imply	that	knowledge	requires	us	to	meet	a	very	
demanding	standard.7	Likewise,	the	skeptic	seems	to	presuppose	an	infallibilist	principle	like	this	
one:	if	I	know	that	p,	then	I	can	eliminate	all	grounds	for	doubting	it.	Put	another	way,	Descartes	and	
the	skeptic	seem	to	suggest	that	knowing	p	requires	one	to	have	evidence	or	reasons	sufficient	to	
rule	out	all	the	alternative	possibilities	to	p.	This	is	a	version	of	‘high-standards’	skepticism	because	it	
requires	knowers	to	justify	their	belief	to	the	highest	possible	degree.8		
A	common	response	to	such	skeptical	arguments	is	to	treat	them	as	depending	on	too	stringent	a	
conception	of	knowledge	(Reed	2012:	585).	That	is,	we	may	agree	with	the	skeptic	that	hardly	any	
belief	can	be	justified	to	the	highest	degree.	After	all,	our	cognitive	faculties	are	too	imperfect	to	
establish	the	truth	of	a	proposition	with	100%	certainty.	But	who	cares?	So	what	if	nothing	meets	
this	incredibly	high	standard?	After	all,	many	things	are	probably	true	and	it	is	reasonable	for	us	to	
believe	those	things.	Indeed,	even	granting	that	nothing	is	certain,	why	conclude	that	we	have	no	
knowledge?	While	the	skeptic	believes	that	we	cannot	know	what	we	cannot	confirm	with	100%	
certainty,	fallibilists	have	a	more	moderate	view.	Absolutely	certainty	is	not	required	for	knowledge.	
As	Baron	Reed	puts	it,	“our	faculties	are	still	very	good	.	.	.	they	allow	us	to	achieve	a	more	modest	
sort	of	cognitive	success.	Fallibilism,	then,	takes	that	modest	success	to	be	knowledge”	(2012:	585).	
Duncan	Pritchard	expresses	a	similar	thought:		
it	doesn’t	seem	at	all	credible	that	the	bar	for	knowledge	should	be	set	so	high	as	to	demand	infallibility	
or	absolute	certainty	(or,	for	that	matter,	indubitability).	On	the	contrary,	our	everyday	conception	of	
																																								 																				
6	‘Certainty’	is	ambiguous	(cf.	Reed	2008).	A	belief	is	psychologically	certain	when	one	is	supremely	convinced	of	its	truth.	A	
belief	is	epistemically	certain	when	it	has	the	highest	possible	epistemic	status.	Some	infallibilists	say	that	psychological	
certainty	is	necessary	for	knowledge,	while	others	say	that	epistemic	certainty	is	necessary.		
7	I	do	not	actually	agree	with	this	interpretation	of	Descartes,	but	I	set	this	issue	aside.	See	Pasnau	(2017)	for	a	discussion	
of	this	point.		
8	Stroud	(1984)	seems	to	interpret	Descartes	as	endorsing	a	‘high	standards’	view.		
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knowledge	seems	to	leave	us	perfectly	happy	with	the	idea	that	knowledge	can	be	fallible	and	not	
absolutely	certain	(and	thus	to	a	degree	dubitable)	while	being	bona	fide	knowledge	nonetheless.	
(2019:	36)	
I	think	this	reaction	is	exactly	right.	If	the	skeptic	sets	the	bar	for	knowledge	too	high,	then	we	should	
reject	that	standard	(see	Hannon	2019a).	The	epistemic	contextualists	have	adopted	this	line	of	
reasoning.9	Their	solution	to	skepticism	involves	two	basic	elements:	first,	in	ordinary	contexts	we	
often	meet	the	reasonable	(fallible)	epistemic	standard	for	knowledge;	second,	in	skeptical	contexts	
the	standards	to	know	are	much	higher.10	As	DeRose	puts	it,		
In	some	contexts,	‘‘S	knows	that	p’’	requires	for	its	truth	that	S	have	a	true	belief	that	p	and	also	be	in	a	
very	strong	epistemic	position	with	respect	to	p,	while	in	other	contexts,	an	assertion	of	the	very	same	
sentence	may	require	for	its	truth,	in	addition	to	S’s	having	a	true	belief	that	p,	only	that	S	meet	some	
lower	epistemic	standard.	(2009:	3)	
A	core	feature	of	contextualism	is	that	we	need	not	meet	the	skeptic’s	very	high	epistemic	standard	
to	have	knowledge	in	daily	life.	This	is	fallibilism.	The	contextualist	is	a	fallibilist	who	rejects	(or	at	
least	confines)	the	infallible	standard	assumed	by	the	skeptic.			
While	this	response	to	skepticism	is	prima	facie	plausible,	it	only	gains	purchase	if	we	satisfy	some	
reasonable	epistemic	standard	that	ordinarily	suffices	for	knowledge.	After	all,	the	contextualist	line	
is	precisely	that	in	everyday	contexts	our	knowledge	claims	are	true	because	the	standards	are	not	
too	demanding.	However,	the	most	challenging	skeptical	arguments	do	not	simply	claim	that	we	fail	
to	meet	some	extraordinary	standard	for	knowledge.	Rather,	they	claim	that	we	do	not	meet	even	
ordinary	(fallible)	standards.	I	will	consider	this	view	in	the	next	section.		
	
Hard-hitting	Skepticism	
The	contextualist	portrays	the	dispute	between	the	skeptic	and	the	non-skeptic	as	a	difference	
between	using	stricter	standards	and	more	lax	ones.	On	this	interpretation,	the	skeptic	may	be	
accused	of	merely	imposing	abnormal	requirements	on	our	familiar	concept	of	knowledge.	As	Hans-
Johann	Glock	says,	“the	skeptic	.	.	.	is	like	someone	who	claims	that	there	are	no	physicians	in	
London,	since	by	‘physician’	he	understands	someone	who	can	cure	any	disease	within	twenty	
minutes”	(2010:	100).		
																																								 																				
9	See	Cohen	(1988),	DeRose	(1995),	and	Lewis	(1996)	for	early	statements	of	this	view.		
10	I	have	not	indicated	semantic	ascent	by	putting	quotation	marks	around	‘know’	and	‘knowledge’.	I	state	my	discussion	in	
the	object	language	for	ease	of	exposition.		
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But	this	misportrays	the	skeptic’s	view.	As	Bryan	Frances	writes,	“the	skeptic	isn’t	complaining	that	
our	knowledge	doesn’t	satisfy	some	super-duper	high-octane	condition	that	only	a	philosopher	
could	love”	(2008:	243).	Rather,	the	skeptic	is	arguing	that	it	is	much	more	difficult	than	we	realized	
for	a	belief	to	qualify	as	knowledge	even	by	ordinary	standards.11	In	presenting	her	argument,	the	
skeptic	raises	doubts	about	whether	we	actually	satisfy	the	very	same	epistemic	standards	that	we	
have	always	thought	we	satisfied,	not	some	unattainably	high	standard.	Thus,	any	solution	that	
characterizes	the	skeptic	as	“raising	the	standards”	or	smuggling	in	abnormal	requirements	would	
mischaracterize	the	view.		
What	about	the	skepticism	of	Descartes’	Meditations?	As	previously	mentioned,	several	
philosophers	have	interpreted	the	Cartesian	skeptic	as	imposing	high	standards	or	presupposing	
infallibilism.12		
But	this	connection	between	infallibilism	and	skepticism	may	be	a	red	herring.	As	John	Greco	(2008:	
116),	Allan	Hazlett	(2014:	90),	and	others	have	pointed	out,	the	Cartesian	skeptical	argument	does	
not	essentially	depend	on	infallibilism.	The	Cartesian	skeptical	argument	runs	as	follows:		
1. I	know	that	I	have	hands	only	if	I	can	know	that	I’m	not	deceived	by	a	demon	(about	whether	
I	have	hands).		
2. I	can’t	know	that	I’m	not	deceived	by	a	demon	(about	whether	I	have	hands).	
3. Therefore,	I	don’t	know	that	I	have	hands.		
None	of	the	motivations	for	the	first	or	second	premise	presuppose	infallibilism.	The	Cartesian	
skeptic	is	not	claiming	that	you	cannot	be	certain	that	you’re	not	deceived	by	a	demon,	and	
therefore	know	very	little.	That	would	presuppose	infallibilism.	The	idea	behind	the	Cartesian	
skeptical	argument	is,	as	Hazlett	says,	“that	you’ve	got	no	way	of	knowing	whether	you’re	deceived,	
and	therefore	know	very	little”	(2014:	90).		
Nevertheless,	many	people	are	unwilling	to	grant	the	skeptical	premise	that	we	don’t	(or	can’t)	know	
that	we’re	not	deceived.	Instead	of	allowing	the	skeptic	to	use	claims	like	“I	can’t	know	that	I’m	not	
being	deceived”	as	premises	in	her	reasoning,	we	should	instead	expect	the	skeptic	to	convince	us	
that	we	can’t	know	this.13	As	Greco	writes,		
																																								 																				
11	Feldman	(1999;	2001),	Klein	(2000),	Kornblith	(2000),	Bach	(2005),	Hazlett	(2014),	and	Pritchard	(2019)	raise	versions	of	
this	objection.		
12	Unger	(1975)	and	BonJour	(2010)	also	seem	to	defend	versions	of	high-standards	skepticism.		
13	Pryor	(2000)	attempts	to	formulate	a	version	of	skepticism	that	does	not	require	this	controversial	premise.		
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Is	that	premise	[that	I	cannot	know	that	I	am	not	a	brain	in	a	vat]	initially	(or	pretheoretically)	plausible?	
It	seems	to	me	that	it	is	not.	In	fact,	it	seems	to	me	that	it	is	initially	obvious	that	I	do	know	that	I	am	
not	a	brain	in	a	vat.	(2008:	111)		
Whatever	we	think	of	this	response	to	the	skeptic,	there	are	two	important	lessons	to	draw	out	from	
the	current	discussion.	First,	to	portray	the	skeptic	as	demanding	that	we	justify	our	beliefs	to	the	
highest	degree	is	to	mischaracterize	their	view.	The	really	worrying	form	of	skepticism	is	not	‘high	
standards’	skepticism	but	rather	what	I	call	‘hard-hitting	skepticism’.	The	hard-hitting	skeptic	says	
that	our	beliefs	fail	to	qualify	as	knowledge	by	ordinary	standards.		
The	second	lesson	is	this:	a	common	source	of	resistance	to	skepticism	is	the	implausibility	of	far-
fetched	scenarios	involving	evil	demons,	brains	in	vats,	and	so	forth.	As	Frances	(2008)	observes,	this	
is	one	thing	that	commonly	bothers	undergraduates	in	philosophy.	They	object:		
why	on	earth	do	some	philosophers	take	the	BIV	[brain	in	a	vat]	hypothesis	to	pose	any	threat	at	all	to	
our	beliefs,	given	that	those	very	same	philosophers	think	that	there	is	no	real	chance	that	the	BIV	
hypothesis	is	true?	Sure,	the	BIV	hypothesis	is	formally	inconsistent	with	my	belief	that	I	have	hands,	so	
if	the	former	is	true,	then	my	belief	is	false.	But	so	what?	Why	should	that	bare	inconsistency	matter	so	
much?	The	students	would	understand	the	fuss	over	the	BIV	hypothesis	if	there	were	some	decent	
reason	to	think	that	the	BIV	hypothesis	was	really	true.	(Frances	2008:	225)	
A	more	threatening	and	significant	type	of	skepticism,	then,	would	meet	two	conditions.	First,	it	
would	not	characterize	the	skeptic	as	demanding	infallibility	or	the	highest	possible	degree	of	
justification.	Second,	it	would	not	be	based	on	doubts	that	are	“purely	philosophical”	or	“merely	
academic	threats”	(Frances	2008:	228).	Rather,	it	would	involve	what	C.	S.	Peirce	calls	a	“real”	doubt.	
(We	don’t	really	doubt	the	existence	of	the	external	world.)	In	the	next	section,	I	will	outline	a	
sceptical	hypothesis	that	meets	these	two	criteria	and	thereby	generates	a	“real”	skeptical	threat.14	
	
Skepticism	and	Rational	Evaluation		
This	section	will	outline	a	type	of	contingent	real-world	skepticism	that	has	not	received	much	
attention.	Unlike	‘high-standards’	skepticism,	this	view	does	not	demand	infallibility	or	
extraordinarily	high	justification.	Unlike	Cartesian	skepticism,	it	does	not	rely	on	remote	possibilities,	
such	as	the	possibility	that	one	is	a	brain	in	a	vat	or	radically	deceived	by	an	evil	demon.15	Rather,	I	
																																								 																				
14	Pyrrhonian	skepticism	in	no	way	depends	on	the	problematic	assumptions	outlined	above.	The	pyrrhonist	did	not	claim	
the	standards	for	knowledge	were	incredibly	high,	nor	did	they	appeal	to	far-fetched	skeptical	scenarios.		
15	Here	I	follow	Frances’s	(2005)	strategy	to	outline	what	he	calls	a	“live”	skeptical	hypothesis.	Frances	says	that	a	
hypothesis	is	live	when	it	satisfies	five	conditions:	(i)	it	has	been	through	a	significant	evaluation	in	the	community	by	
experts	over	many	years;	(ii)	it	is	judged	actually	true	or	as	likely	to	be	true	as	any	relevant	possibility	by	a	significant	
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will	present	an	empirically	informed,	scientifically	respectable	skeptical	hypothesis	that	targets	many	
of	our	most	cherished	beliefs.	More	specifically,	I	will	outline	a	type	of	skepticism	that	targets	many	
beliefs	that	are	the	product	of	reasoning.		
I	am	using	‘reasoning’	quite	broadly	to	refer	to	cases	in	which	we	have	evidence	and	draw	
conclusions	on	the	basis	of	rationally	evaluating	the	evidence.	Put	differently,	I	am	thinking	of	cases	
in	which	we	exercise	our	rational	capacities	to	acquire	knowledge.	This	contrasts	with	more	basic	
and	immediate	cases	of	perceptual	knowledge,	which	require	little	to	no	reflection	or	reasoning.		
Consider	the	following	example.16	Irena	suspects	that	the	death	penalty	is	not	an	effective	tool	to	
reduce	the	murder	rate,	but	she	doesn’t	have	much	evidence	either	way.	To	become	more	
informed,	she	decides	to	look	for	evidence	about	the	deterrent	effects	of	capital	punishment.	After	
searching	several	reputable	websites	and	reading	multiple	academic	articles,	Irena	concludes	that	
the	evidence	strongly	indicates	that	the	death	penalty	does	not	reduce	the	murder	rate.	Irena	is	
intelligent,	articulate,	and	is	now	able	to	present	reasons	for	her	belief.	Moreover,	she	now	believes	
that	the	reasons	for	which	she	holds	her	belief	are	the	reasons	she	is	now	able	to	present.		
This	might	seem	like	a	reliable	way	to	form	beliefs,	but	we	have	abundant	evidence	that	this	process	
of	reasoning	is	likely	beset	by	a	host	of	cognitive	biases	and	reasoning	errors.	For	example,	the	
general	human	tendency	to	rationalize	is	more	common	than	we	are	wont	to	believe.17	This	occurs	
even	when	people	offer	what	in	fact	turn	out	to	be	sound	arguments.	Though	they	may	have	
successfully	hit	on	a	good	argument,	they	are	still	rationalizing	because	they	would	have	held	the	
same	view	with	or	without	good	reasons,	i.e.	on	the	basis	of	non-rational	considerations.		
Suppose	that	Irena	has	views	about	the	morality	of	the	death	penalty	that	she	holds	on	grounds	
independently	of	her	views	about	its	deterrent	effects.	These	moral	commitments	will	likely	drive	
her	views	about	the	deterrent	effects	of	the	death	penalty.	For	instance,	Irena	will	inflate	the	quality	
of	the	studies	that	present	evidence	in	favour	of	her	moral	view	and	she	will	be	far	more	critical	of	
(and	more	likely	to	downplay	the	significance	of)	studies	that	provide	evidence	that	cut	against	her	
moral	view.	In	other	words,	her	views	about	the	death	penalty’s	effectiveness	will	not	be	the	result	
of	her	understanding	the	relevant	data.	Quite	the	opposite:	her	understanding	of	the	relevant	data	
will	be	the	product	of	her	moral	beliefs.	Moreover,	Irena	will	be	completely	unaware	of	this	fact.	She	
will	sincerely	believe	that	her	reasons	for	belief	are	different	from	her	actual	reasons.		
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
number	of	experts;	(iii)	the	judgment	of	those	experts	has	been	reached	in	an	epistemically	responsible	way;	(iv)	those	
experts	consider	there	to	be	several	independent	sources	of	evidence	for	the	hypothesis;	(v)	many	of	those	experts	
consider	the	hypothesis	to	be	a	live	possibility	(see	Frances	2005:	18-9).		
16	This	example	is	adapted	from	Kornblith	(1999:	181-2).	
17	For	a	defense	of	this	view,	see	Kornblith	(1999),	Tavris	and	Aronson	(2007),	Haidt	(2012),	Sperber	and	Mercier	(2017).		
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Irena	is	not	a	unique	case.	A	vast	amount	of	work	in	cognitive	psychology	indicates	that	we	all	
frequently	interpret	and	filter	evidence	in	ways	that	fit	with	our	antecedent	worldview.18	For	
example,	we	selectively	expose	ourselves	to	evidence	that	confirms	our	pre-existing	beliefs	and	
avoid	information	that	conflicts	with	them.	This	is	known	as	selective	exposure	(Nickerson	1998).	We	
also	tend	to	uncritically	accept	(and	better	remember)	evidence	that	is	favourable	to	our	view,	
whereas	we	are	far	more	critical	(and	forgetful)	of	counterevidence.	We	“routinely	rationalize	the	
facts,	figures,	and	arguments	that	[we]	cannot	effortlessly	discount,	depreciate,	denigrate,	or	deny”	
(Lodge	and	Taber	2013:	59).	This	general	human	tendency	to	accept	confirming	evidence	without	
much	scrutiny	and	subject	disconfirming	evidence	to	highly	critical	evaluation	is	known	as	biased	
assimilation	or	confirmation	bias	(Lord	et	al.	1979).	When	this	occurs,	two	people	can	look	at	the	
exact	same	body	of	evidence	and	yet	walk	away	with	radically	different	conclusions	about	what	the	
evidence	shows,	thereby	drawing	undue	support	for	their	initial	positions.19		
In	general,	our	belief-forming	processes	are	often	corrupted	by	an	array	of	normal	human	cognitive	
and	affective	tendencies.	Following	Aaron	Ancell	(2019:	411),	I	will	call	these	“sources	of	unreason”.	
Sources	of	unreason	include:	our	prejudices	and	biases	(both	implicit	and	explicit);	the	tendency	of	
self-interest	and	group-interest	to	distort	our	judgments;	stubbornness	and	dogmatism;	bad	
reasoning;	the	desire	to	reduce	cognitive	dissonance;	and	psychological	comfort.	Our	reasoning	is	
especially	prone	to	error	or	bias	when	it	comes	to	beliefs	that	matter	to	us;	e.g.,	our	moral,	political,	
and	personal	beliefs	that	are	partly	constitutive	of	our	identity	(Haidt	2012).	These	‘identity-
constitutive	beliefs’	include	any	belief	that	reflects	one’s	conception	of	“who	they	are,	of	what	sort	
of	people	they	are,	and	how	they	relate	to	others”	(Hogg	and	Abrams	1988:	2).	Moreover,	these	
corrupting	motivations	are	not	transparent	to	us.	We	believe	that	the	reasons	we	present	are	the	
reasons	for	which	we	hold	our	beliefs,	but	we	are	often	wrong	about	this.	We	think	we	are	
motivated	by	the	desire	for	truth,	but	our	other	motives	are	concealed	from	our	view	(Wilson	2002).		
This	raises	a	general	doubt	about	human	reasoning.	As	Ancell	writes,	“Our	reasoning	capacities	are	
beset	by	an	array	of	built-in	cognitive	and	affective	biases	that	make	it	very	difficult—often	
practically	impossible—for	us	to	think	clearly	and	objectively	about	issues	that	affect	our	interests	
and	arouse	our	passions”	(2019:	418).	This	would	not	be	so	worrying	if	we	were	able	to	
introspectively	discern	our	own	biases	and	cognitive	shortcomings.	However,	we	are	typically	
																																								 																				
18	See	Gilovich	(1993)	for	an	overview.		
19	These	biases	are	sometimes	collectively	referred	to	as	“motivated	reasoning”,	which	is	“the	tendency	to	seek	out,	
interpret,	evaluate,	and	weigh	evidence	and	arguments	in	ways	that	are	systematically	biased	toward	conclusions	that	we	
‘want’	to	reach	for	reasons	independent	of	their	truth	or	warrant”	(Ancell	2019:	418).	See	also	Kunda	(1990);	Ditto,	Pizarro,	
and	Tannenbaum	(2009);	Lodge	and	Taber	(2013).	
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introspectively	blind	to	them	(Pronin,	Lin,	and	Ross	2002).20	While	it	might	seem	to	us	that	we	are	
being	impartial	and	unbiased,	we	are	often	“twisting	the	argument	and	evidence	to	make	them	fit	
the	conclusions	we	‘want’	to	reach”	(Ancell	2019:	419).	We	suffer	from	what	psychologists	call	the	
illusion	of	objectivity	(Kunda	1990).		
In	addition	to	the	general	human	tendencies	to	rationalize,	assimilate	information	in	biased	ways,	
and	selectively	expose	ourselves	to	favourable	information,	there	are	many	other	biases	and	
cognitive	errors	to	which	we	humans	are	prone.	For	instance,	hundreds	of	studies	have	confirmed	
the	existence	of	a	hindsight	bias,	which	occurs	when	people	who	know	the	outcome	of	an	event	
judge	it	to	be	more	probable	than	people	who	are	ignorant	of	the	outcome	(Roese	and	Vohs	2002).	
This	is	known	to	affect	judgments	about	topics	as	diverse	as	terrorist	attacks,	medical	diagnoses,	and	
accounting	decisions.	In	addition,	we	all	have	implicit	biases	where	we	unconsciously	and	
automatically	associate	concepts	with	one	another.	Such	biases	are	especially	pernicious	when	we	
associate	certain	traits	(e.g.,	dangerous)	with	members	of	particular	social	groups.21	Further,	there	is	
considerable	evidence	that	many	of	our	most	cherished	beliefs	are	shaped	by	irrelevant	influences	
that	do	not	bear	on	the	truth	of	what	we	believe	(Vavova	2018).	For	instance,	the	fact	that	you	were	
raised	in	one	community	rather	than	another	seems	epistemically	irrelevant	to	what	you	ought	to	
believe	about	God,	morality,	or	politics.	But	factors	like	upbringing	are	known	to	guide	our	
convictions	on	these	and	other,	less	charged,	topics.22	(While	this	is	not	itself	a	psychological	bias,	it	
does	further	illustrate	the	vast	extent	to	which	our	beliefs	are	not	the	product	of	a	reliable	belief-
forming	process.)		
These	are	just	a	handful	of	our	many	cognitive	shortcomings.	It	would	be	impossible	to	provide	a	
comprehensive	overview	of	all	the	epistemically	irrational	biases	in	human	reasoning	that	should	be	
of	interest	to	epistemologists.	However,	these	few	examples	illustrate	a	general	worry	about	human	
reasoning.	We	fail	on	a	variety	of	cognitive	dimensions	and,	as	a	result,	we	have	a	distorted	sense	of	
the	plausibility	of	our	own	beliefs.	In	other	words,	our	epistemic	situation	is	likely	much	worse	than	
																																								 																				
20	As	Ballantyne	(2019:	131)	writes:	“A	central	idea	in	psychology	is	that	most	biases	are	not	reliably	detected	by	
introspection	(Nisbett	and	Wilson	1977;	Wilson	and	Brekke	1994;	Kahneman	2003).	We	typically	can’t	figure	out	whether	
we	are	biased	by	merely	gazing	into	our	minds.	Biases	normally	‘leave	no	trace’	in	consciousness.	As	Timothy	Wilson	and	
Nancy	Brekke	quip,	‘Human	judgments—even	very	bad	ones—do	not	smell’	(1994:	121).	From	the	inside,	biased	attitudes	
seem	just	like	unbiased	ones.”		
21	Jennifer	Saul	(2013)	has	argued,	compellingly,	that	implicit	biases	present	a	skeptical	challenge	to	the	ordinary	ways	that	
we	assess	reasons,	arguments,	and	evidence.	While	my	argument	is	similar	to	Saul’s,	it	has	wider	scope.	Saul	presents	a	
challenge	to	beliefs	that	may	be	influenced	by	implicit	biases,	whereas	I	raise	doubts	about	our	rational	capacities	more	
generally.	That	said,	we	both	agree	that	(a)	the	rational	evaluation	of	evidence	and	arguments	is	often	corrupted	by	
problematic	psychological	tendencies,	(b)	this	influence	operates	below	the	level	of	consciousness,	and	(c)	this	provides	a	
reason	for	skepticism	about	such	beliefs.		
22	Sometimes	factors	like	upbringing	will	affect	our	convictions	in	perfectly	rational	ways,	since	they	expose	us	to	different	
experiences	and	thus	different	bodies	of	evidence.	However,	there	are	also	many	cases	in	which	factors	like	upbringing	are	
epistemically	irrelevant.		
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we	think.	Moreover,	these	cognitive	shortcomings	are	not	rare	but	rather	are	the	norm.	There	is	
plenty	of	evidence	that	rationalization	is	extremely	widespread,	especially	when	it	comes	to	beliefs	
that	matter	to	us;	e.g.,	our	political	beliefs,	moral	beliefs,	religious	beliefs,	or	any	other	issue	that	
affects	our	interests	or	stirs	our	emotions	(Haidt	2012).		
Astute	observers	of	human	nature	anticipated	these	psychological	findings.	Francis	Bacon	wrote,	
“The	human	understanding	when	it	has	once	adopted	an	opinion	(either	as	being	the	received	
opinion	or	as	being	agreeable	in	itself)	draws	all	things	else	to	support	and	agree	with	it”	(1620:	
XLVI).	Bertrand	Russell	said,	“It	is	a	law	of	our	being	that,	whenever	it	is	in	any	way	possible,	we	
adopt	beliefs	as	will	preserve	our	self-respect”	(2004	[1928]:	51).	British	essayist	William	Hazlitt	
noted,	“The	narrowness	of	the	heart	warps	the	understanding,	and	makes	us	weigh	objects	in	the	
scales	of	our	self-love,	instead	of	those	of	truth	and	justice”	(1824:	34).	And	John	Locke	remarked	on	
the	deplorable	state	of	the	human	mind	in	his	posthumously	published	work,	Of	the	Conduct	of	the	
Understanding:		
There	are	several	weaknesses	and	defects	in	the	understanding,	either	from	the	natural	temper	of	the	
mind	or	ill	habits	taken	up,	which	hinder	it	in	its	progress	to	knowledge.	Of	these	there	are	as	many	
possibly	to	be	found,	if	the	mind	were	thoroughly	studied,	as	there	are	diseases	of	the	body,	each	
whereof	clogs	and	disables	the	understanding	to	some	degree,	and	therefore	deserves	to	be	looked	at	
and	cured.		(1996	[1706],	187;	§12)	
Although	Locke	was	keenly	aware	of	our	intellectual	imperfections,	he	was	optimistic	about	our	
ability	to	overcome	them.	He	prescribes	that	we	impartially	self-examine	our	own	beliefs	to	root	out	
“the	prejudices	imbibed	from	education,	party,	reverence,	fashion,	interest”	(1996	[1706]	184	§10).	
In	other	words,	he	thinks	that	rigorous	self-study	will	help	to	expose	our	biases.	But	this	seems	
overly	optimistic.	Self-judgment	is	often	clouded	by	rationalization	and	prejudice,	so	attempts	to	
watch	for	signs	of	bad	reasoning	will	go	undetected	and	leave	us	thinking	that	we’ve	actually	tuned	
them	out.	As	Nathan	Ballantyne	writes,	“The	feeling	that	we’ve	done	our	best	to	be	unbiased	will	
encourage	us	to	think	we	are	unbiased,	but	that	feeling	should	not	be	trusted”	(2019:	131-2).		
	
A	Skeptical	Argument		
These	biases	and	psychological	shortcomings	pose	a	significant	epistemic	threat	to	our	beliefs.	When	
our	beliefs	are	shaped	by	sources	of	unreason,	this	casts	doubt	on	the	epistemic	quality	of	those	
beliefs.	This	implies	a	form	of	skepticism.	Consider	the	following	skeptical	argument,	which	I	will	call	
skepticism	from	unreason:		
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1. Many	of	our	beliefs	are	shaped	by	sources	of	unreason.		
2. When	a	belief	is	shaped	by	sources	of	unreason,	we	should	significantly	reduce	our	
confidence	in	it.			
3. Therefore,	we	should	significantly	reduce	our	confidence	in	many	of	our	beliefs.			
We	can	also	derive	a	form	of	skepticism	about	knowledge:		
1. If	we	have	a	reason	to	significantly	reduce	our	confidence	in	a	belief,	then	that	belief	does	
not	amount	to	knowledge.		
2. We	have	a	reason	to	significantly	reduce	our	confidence	in	many	of	our	beliefs.		
3. Therefore,	many	of	our	beliefs	do	not	constitute	knowledge.		
This	does	not	yet	give	us	a	very	worrying	skeptical	result.	While	it	does	show	that	many	of	our	beliefs	
do	not	constitute	knowledge,	it	leaves	open	the	possibility	that	we	can	tell	when	the	process	of	
rational	evaluation	generates	justified	(or	known)	beliefs	and	when	it	goes	awry.	To	derive	a	
worrying	skeptical	conclusion,	we	must	not	only	show	that	some	of	our	beliefs	are	shaped	by	
sources	of	unreason.	(We	knew	that	already.)	Rather,	it	must	also	be	true	that	we	are	unable	to	
distinguish	the	beliefs	that	are	shaped	by	sources	of	unreason	from	beliefs	that	have	not	been	
corrupted	by	our	cognitive	biases.	(If	we	were	able	to	determine	which	beliefs	are	the	result	of	
twisting	the	evidence	from	those	that	are	the	product	of	even-handed	rational	evaluation,	the	
skeptical	result	would	be	much	less	threatening.)	As	mentioned,	however,	the	biasing	processes	that	
lead	us	to	rationalize,	to	selectively	filter	our	evidence,	and	so	forth,	typically	take	place	behind	the	
scenes.23	Thus,	we	often	cannot	cancel	out	the	threat	posed	by	our	psychological	shortcomings,	for	
we	lack	some	epistemic	feature	(e.g.,	appropriate	evidence,	reliability,	or	what	not)	that	would	
otherwise	cancel	out	this	threat.	As	Ancell	writes,		
we	lack	reliable	means	of	detecting,	avoiding,	and	correcting	for	these	biases,	[so]	we	cannot	plausibly	
expect	that	otherwise	reasonable	people	will	never	be	led	astray	by	them.	Indeed,	we	must	expect	the	
opposite;	the	.	.	.	reasoning	of	sincere	and	conscientious	people	will	often	be	warped	by	their	biases,	
interests,	partisan	loyalties,	and	so	on.	Because	such	warped	views	are	liable	to	be	unreasonable,	it	
follows	that	sincere	and	conscientious	people	will	often	hold	unreasonable	views.	(2019:	411)	
																																								 																				
23	Externalists	(e.g.,	reliabilists)	might	take	this	as	a	point	in	their	favour,	since	they	will	claim	that	we	needn’t	be	aware	of	
the	reliability	of	our	belief-forming	processes.	However,	externalists	are	not	clearly	at	an	advantage	here	because	the	
relevant	point	is	that	our	beliefs	are	often	the	result	of	an	unreliable	process—not	that	we	lack	introspective	awareness	of	
when	we	are	rationalizing.			
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All	this	should	lead	us	to	doubt	that	our	reasoning	faculties	are	reliable	routes	to	knowledge.	Much	
empirical	research	over	the	past	fifty	years	reveals	the	disturbingly	expansive	range	to	which	
fallibility	enters	our	cognitive	lives.24	This	challenges	the	rational	standing	of	our	beliefs.		
One	might	try	to	safeguard	much	of	our	knowledge	from	these	empirical	findings	by	arguing	as	
follows:	these	findings	do	not	undermine	the	justification	for	our	beliefs	but	rather	they	show	that	
we	are	often	more	confident	than	we	actually	should	be,	and	thus	we	have	irrational	credences.	
However	(the	objection	continues),	it	is	not	obvious	how	irrational	credences	translate	to	the	
justification	of	beliefs,	which	are	ultimately	relevant	for	knowledge.25		
To	illustrate,	let’s	assume	a	simple	minded-threshold	view	where	to	have	a	belief	is	to	have	a	
credence	above	a	certain	threshold.	Given	that,	a	belief	should	count	as	justified	when	it	is	rational	
to	have	a	credence	above	the	threshold.	Now	it	could	easily	be	that	it	is	rational	to	a	have	a	
credence	above	the	threshold	even	when	it	is	not	rational	to	have	the	exact	credence	one	has.	Thus,	
even	if	we	grant	that	our	credences	are	rarely	rational,	it	may	still	be	that	our	beliefs	are	justified	
most	of	the	time.	The	only	cases	where	a	bias	affects	the	justificatory	status	of	a	belief	are	cases	
where	the	respective	bias	leads	us	to	cross	the	threshold.	For	instance,	let's	say	the	threshold	is	0.8	
and	my	rational	credence	is	0.75,	but	due	to	a	bias,	my	actual	credence	is	0.85.	Here	I	end	up	with	an	
unjustified	belief,	given	the	threshold	view.	The	conditions	described,	however,	seem	relatively	
specific,	which	may	lead	one	to	conclude	that	they	are	rarely	instantiated—or	so	the	objection	goes.		
This	objection	highlights	an	important	difference	between	externalist	vs.	internalist	conceptions	of	
justification.	According	to	the	above	objection,	an	agent	may	have	an	irrational	credence	that	results	
from	an	inability	to	properly	evaluate	the	strength	of	their	evidence;	yet	the	agent	may	nonetheless	
achieve	a	level	of	justification	that	suffices	for	their	belief	to	be	knowledge.	However,	many	
epistemologists	will	argue	that	these	various	biases	make	it	impossible	for	one	to	determine	how	
strong	one’s	justification	actually	is,	and	thus	one	cannot	tell	whether	their	justification	is	good	
enough	for	knowledge.	For	a	hardline	externalist,	what	matters	might	be	whether	our	actual	
justification	is	good	enough	for	knowledge.	But	those	with	internalist	leanings,	like	myself,	will	claim	
that	our	inability	to	tell	how	good	our	justification	actually	is	provides	us	with	a	relevant	defeater	for	
knowledge.	After	all,	biases	like	selective	exposure	and	biased	assimilation	lead	us	to	draw	undue	
support	for	our	views	by	filtering	and	processing	the	relevant	evidence	in	epistemically	problematic	
ways.	As	a	result,	the	justification	for	our	beliefs	is	often	the	result	of	twisting	the	evidence	and	
																																								 																				
24	This	may	reflect	the	malaise	of	our	allegedly	‘post-truth’	era.	It	is	not	so	much	the	idea	of	truth	or	the	existence	of	
various	truths	that	has	come	under	attack,	but	rather	the	notion	that	there	can	be	any	such	thing	as	objective	inquiry	into	
it	(Blackburn	2019).		
25	Thanks	to	Alexander	Dinges	for	raising	this	objection.		
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arguments	to	make	them	fit	with	conclusions	we	want	to	reach.	Thus,	our	evidence	is	likely	worse	
than	we	think.	Moreover,	we	cannot	tell	whether	it	is	good	enough	to	qualify	as	knowledge.	This	
provides	us	with	a	reason	to	doubt	whether	our	beliefs	do	qualify	as	knowledge,	in	addition	to	
doubting	that	our	credences	are	rational.		
While	I	have	argued	that	our	beliefs	often	are	shaped	by	sources	of	unreason,	my	skeptical	
argument	does	not	actually	require	our	beliefs	to	have	been	shaped	by	any	such	source.	All	that	is	
required	is	that	the	relevant	belief	is	one	that	reasonably	could	have	been	influenced	by	a	source	of	
unreason	and	we	cannot	tell	whether	this	has	occurred	in	the	relevant	case.	When	this	happens,	we	
have	a	defeater	even	for	those	beliefs	that	are,	in	fact,	based	on	good	reasons	or	evidence.	To	
illustrate,	recall	my	example	of	Irena	and	the	death	penalty.	In	this	case,	I	admitted	the	possibility	
that	she	in	fact	hit	upon	good	arguments	for	her	resulting	belief.	Still,	the	worry	is	that	humans	have	
a	general	tendency	to	rationalize	and	Irena	lacks	the	ability	to	tell	whether	she	holds	her	belief	about	
the	death	penalty’s	deterrent	effects	on	the	basis	of	good	reasons	or	instead	due	to	her	views	about	
the	morality	of	the	death	penalty.26	
These	pessimistic	facts	about	reasoning	and	rationalization	go	some	distance	toward	making	sense	
of	“fallibilist	skepticism”.	This	view	is	skeptical	because	it	provides	a	real,	live	hypothesis	that	targets	
reasoning	as	a	source	of	knowledge.	It	is	also	falliblist	because	this	new	skeptical	hypothesis	does	
not	merely	deny	certainty	or	‘high	standards’	knowledge.	Rather,	it	generates	a	reason	to	deny	the	
entirely	modest	amount	of	epistemic	warrant	we	ordinarily	expect	to	know	something.	Even	though	
many	our	of	beliefs	may	be	true,	the	justification	we	have	for	these	beliefs	is	much	less	than	any	of	
us	have	supposed	in	our	anti-skeptical	moments.	In	short,	the	epistemic	quality	of	our	position	is	
much	worse	than	we	thought.		
	
The	Scope	and	Force	of	Skepticism	
This	view	has	a	narrower	scope	than	some	traditional	forms	of	skepticism.	The	scope	of	skepticism	is	
determined	by	the	set	of	proposition	it	targets,	where	these	proposition	are	said	to	be	unknowable,	
unjustified,	or	those	about	which	we	should	suspend	judgment.	Some	skeptics	target	all	claims	
about	the	external	world.	Others	target	our	knowledge	of	the	mental	lives	of	others.	Still	others	
target	only	propositions	about	the	future,	the	past,	or	religious	matters.	The	type	of	skepticism	I	am	
																																								 																				
26	One	might	take	this	as	a	reason	in	favor	of	externalist.	For	what	it’s	worth,	I	don’t	think	we	should	adopt	philosophical	
positions	simply	because	we	don’t	like	skeptical	conclusions.	(That	said,	in	Hannon	2019b	I	argue	that	we	can	reject	
skepticism	because	it	is	impractical	in	a	particular	way.)	In	any	case,	adopting	a	version	of	externalism	that	allows	us	to	call	
these	beliefs	‘justified’	or	‘knowledge’	would	still	leave	untouched	my	real	concern,	namely,	that	we	care	about	being	able	
to	tell	how	good	our	epistemic	position	actually	is.	I	find	the	externalist	retreat	of	little	practical	value	in	responding	to	this	
concern,	even	though	it	may	allow	us	to	continue	calling	certain	beliefs	‘justified’	or	‘knowledge’.		
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outlining,	by	contrast,	targets	the	propositional	contents	of	many	beliefs	yielded	by	rational	
evaluation.27	These	beliefs	are	targeted	on	the	grounds	that	they	are	likely	corrupted	by	error	and	
bias,	especially	when	these	beliefs	are	partly	constitutive	of	our	identity.28		
Not	all	beliefs	that	are	the	product	of	reasoning	will	be	subject	to	the	concerns	I	have	raised.	
Suppose,	for	example,	that	I	come	to	believe	that	we	have	enough	milk	for	the	next	week	on	the	
grounds	that	we	have	four	litres	and	we	tend	to	go	through	about	a	litre	every	two	days.		A	belief	
like	this	is	not	(obviously)	likely	to	be	shaped	by	“sources	of	unreason”.29	Many	of	our	beliefs	formed	
through	reasoning	will	be	of	this	form.	Still,	the	literature	in	psychology	makes	clear	that	the	extent	
to	which	our	beliefs	are	shaped	by	sources	of	unreason	is	indeed	quite	broad.	In	addition	to	pretty	
much	all	of	our	moral,	political,	philosophical,	and	religious	beliefs,	it	will	also	concern	other	
“cherished	beliefs”	(e.g.,	related	to	family	members,	sports	teams,	professional	employment,	etc.),	
beliefs	that	are	influenced	by	our	implicit	biases	and	prejudices	(see	Saul	2013	for	the	extent	to	
which	this	is	troubling),	beliefs	influenced	by	‘ingroup’	and	‘outgroup’	bias	(the	research	on	‘minimal	
group	paradigms’	reveals	that	even	arbitrary	distinctions	between	groups,	such	as	preferences	for	
certain	paintings,	beliefs	about	whether	hotdogs	are	sandwiches,	or	the	color	of	their	shirts	can	
trigger	a	tendency	to	favor	one's	own	group),	or	other	issues	that	affect	our	interests,	stir	our	
emotions,	or	challenge	our	worldview.		
Although	this	version	of	skepticism	has	narrower	scope	than	traditional	(i.e.	radical)	skepticism,	I	
believe	it	packs	more	punch.	Instead	of	relying	on	the	far-fetched	possibility	that	an	evil	demon	is	
controlling	our	minds	(or	that	we	are	brains	in	vats,	etc.),	we	have	the	much	more	live	(and	
empirically	supported)	hypothesis	that	our	cognitive	biases	are	leading	us	astray.	It	is	not	just	the	
possibility	of	cognitive	error	or	bias	that	is	raised;	the	research	in	psychology	and	cognitive	science	
suggests	that	it	is	very	likely	that	we	are	doing	these	things	quite	often.30	As	a	result,	this	type	of	
skepticism	is	more	likely	to	engender	doubt	and	to	inspire	behaviour.	This	contrasts	with	the	fairly	
ineffective	change	in	belief	and	behaviour	brought	about	by	traditional	forms	of	skepticism.	As	
Hume	observed,	the	activities	of	ordinary	life	were	sufficient	to	dispel	traditional	skeptical	doubts:		
																																								 																				
27	We	can	also	put	this	point	in	terms	of	distrusting	a	putative	source	of	knowledge.	While	the	traditional	skeptic	targets	
beliefs	yielded	by	sense	perception,	my	skeptic	targets	those	produced	by	reasoning	or	rational	evaluation.		
28	While	I	have	focused	on	beliefs	that	are	the	product	of	reasoning,	the	concerns	I	have	raised	may	also	target	some	
perceptual	beliefs,	beliefs	based	on	memory,	and	the	acceptance	of	testimony.	In	the	case	of	perceptual	beliefs,	it	is	well	
known	that	our	‘group	identity’	can	shape	our	perceptions	of	reality.	This	explains	why	sports	fans	who	cheer	for	different	
teams	will	perceive	games	differently	(see	Hastorf	and	Cantril	1954).	In	the	case	of	memory,	we	suffer	from	‘rosy	
retrospection’	(Mitchell	et	al.	1997)	and	hindsight	bias	(Roese	and	Vohs	2002).	And	in	the	case	of	beliefs	based	on	
testimony,	the	literature	on	epistemic	injustice	provides	compelling	evidence	that	we	may	routinely	give	too	little	(or	too	
much)	credibility	to	certain	sources	of	testimony	(see	Fricker	2007).			
29	Thanks	to	Martin	Smith	for	this	point	and	example.		
30	Saul	(2013)	makes	a	similar	point.		
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Most	fortunately	it	happens,	that	since	reason	is	incapable	of	dispelling	these	clouds,	nature	herself	
suffices	for	that	purpose,	and	cures	me	of	this	philosophical	melancholy	and	delirium	.	.	.	I	dine,	I	play	a	
game	of	back-gammon,	I	converse,	and	am	merry	with	my	friends;	and	when	after	three	or	four	hour's	
amusement,	I	wou'd	return	to	these	speculations,	they	appear	so	cold,	and	strain'd,	and	ridiculous,	that	
I	cannot	find	in	my	heart	to	enter	into	them	any	farther.	(2003:	bk.1,	pt.4,	sec.7)	
Similarly,	C.	S.	Peirce	wrote,	“Let	us	not	pretend	to	doubt	in	philosophy	what	we	do	not	doubt	in	our	
hearts”	(1893:	CP	5.265).	The	most	forceful	and	interesting	skeptical	challenges	provide	us	with	
doubts	that	are	genuinely	compelling	—	i.e.	they	present	us	with	good	reasons	to	think	we	are	very	
likely	making	errors	and	they	challenge	our	ability	to	inquire	responsibly.31	Skepticism	about	rational	
evaluation	does	precisely	this.		
	
Final	Thoughts		
Is	this	type	of	skepticism	really	all	that	troubling?	You	might	think	the	doubt	cast	on	our	beliefs	is	
fairly	localized.	Saul	considers	this	objection	in	her	article	on	skepticism	and	implicit	bias.	She	writes,			
It	seems,	at	first,	to	be	like	the	sort	of	doubt	we	experience	when	we	discover	how	poor	we	are	at	
probabilistic	reasoning.	We	have	extremely	good	reason	to	think	we’re	making	errors	when	we	make	
judgments	of	likelihood.	But	this	sort	of	doubt	doesn’t	trouble	us	all	that	much	because	we	know	
exactly	when	we	should	worry	and	what	we	should	do	about	it:	if	we	find	ourselves	estimating	
likelihood,	we	should	mistrust	our	instincts	and	either	follow	mechanical	procedures	we’ve	learned	or	
consult	an	expert	(if	not	in	person,	then	on	the	internet).	This	kind	of	worry	is	one	that	everyone	can	
accept	without	feeling	drawn	into	anything	like	skepticism.	(Saul	2012:	250)	
It	may	seem	as	though	skepticism	about	rational	evaluation	is	like	this.	One	might	argue,	for	
example,	that	we	should	not	worry	about	this	type	of	skepticism	because	it	only	concerns	a	small	set	
of	our	total	beliefs.	Moreover,	one	might	argue	that	we	are	aware	of	these	various	biases	and	
cognitive	shortcomings	(after	all,	they	are	well	documented	in	psychology),	so	we	can	guard	against	
them.		
																																								 																				
31	Frances’s	(2005)	work	on	‘live	sceptical	scenarios’	provides	an	instructive	comparison.	However,	the	reasons	he	offers	for	
his	brand	of	skepticism	strike	me	as	less	compelling.	As	Saul	(2013:	254)	observes,	“The	hypotheses	in	question	are	things	
like	eliminativism	about	belief	and	error	theory	about	colour.	And	the	reasons	for	thinking	that	they	are	still	live	is	that	
some	sensible	people	who	know	a	great	deal	endorse	(or	might	endorse)	these	theories	on	the	grounds	of	compelling	
scientific	or	philosophical	reasons.”	But	this	falls	short	of	the	general	doubts	about	human	reasoning	that	I	have	outlined.	
My	claim	is	that	we	all	have	very	good	reason	to	believe	that	we	are	frequently	making	errors	that	have	their	root	in	
motivated	reasoning.	This	is	stronger	than	Frances’s	claim	that	a	hypothesis	is	“live”,	by	which	he	means	(roughly)	that	
sensible	and	knowledgeable	people	might	endorse	it	on	the	basis	of	good	reasons.	I	borrow	this	point	from	Saul	(2013),	
who	makes	a	similar	observation	in	the	context	of	her	own	skeptical	argument	that	is	based	on	implicit	biases.		
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There	are	at	least	two	problems	with	this	reply.	First,	we	should	very	often	be	worried	about	these	
biases	influencing	our	judgments.	As	the	literature	in	psychology	makes	clear,	these	biases	tend	to	
be	triggered	whenever	an	issue	affects	our	interests	or	stirs	our	emotions.	Thus,	we	should	be	
worried	about	the	rationality	of	our	beliefs	in	a	variety	of	situations.	Second,	even	though	we	are	
aware	of	the	existence	of	these	biases,	it	is	unlikely	that	we	can	overcome	them.	Although	a	variety	
of	debiasing	strategies	have	been	proposed	(see	Larrick	2004;	Lilienfeld	et	al.	2009;	Jolls	and	
Sunstein	2006),	Kristoffer	Ahlstrom-Vij	(2013)	identifies	two	obstacles	with	the	attempt	to	debias	
ourselves.	First,	we	are	not	motivated	to	engage	in	debiasing	because	we	do	not	view	ourselves	as	
biased	(which	is	very	common).	Second,	people	who	are	persuaded	to	engage	in	debiasing	efforts	
run	the	risk	of	both	overcorrection	and	undercorrection	(Wilson	2002).		
Some	may	prefer	to	interpret	the	evidence	from	psychology	in	a	less	pessimistic	way.	According	to	
an	alternative	view,	many	of	our	so-called	biases	are	not	really	irrational	at	all.	Rather,	they	reflect	
“bounded	rationality”	(e.g.,	Gigerenzer	et	al.	2001)	or	“instrumental	rationality”	(e.g.,	Kolodny	and	
Brunero	2018).	We	act	in	ways	that	are	boundedly	rational	when	we	employ	cognitive	shortcuts	and	
rules	that	give	rise	to	biases.	As	fallible	beings	with	limited	time	and	cognitive	resources,	it	is	rational	
for	us	to	use	heuristics	and	shortcuts	in	order	to	make	the	best	decisions	we	can,	given	our	
limitations,	even	though	this	type	of	rationality	gives	rise	to	biases	and	errors	in	judgment.	32	
Additionally,	many	of	our	seemingly	irrational	beliefs	may	be	the	result	of	instrumental	rationality,	
since	these	beliefs	play	an	important	role	in	achieving	our	goals.	For	example,	it	may	be	
instrumentally	rational	for	an	individual	to	dogmatically	hold	on	to	certain	political	beliefs	in	the	face	
of	counterevidence	because	changing	one’s	mind	is	a	psychologically	difficult	process	that	could	
potentially	alienate	the	believer	from	their	community	and	sense	of	self.		
This	line	of	reasoning	is	perfectly	sensible,	but	it	does	little	to	blunt	the	force	of	the	skeptic’s	
argument.	The	skeptic	may	simply	argue	that	many	of	our	boundedly	rational	beliefs	do	not	amount	
to	knowledge.	Bounded	rationality	is	achieved	when	we	rely	on	fast	and	frugal	heuristics	to	help	us	
make	sense	of	the	world.	In	general,	this	is	a	good	thing	because	the	world	is	complex	and	we	don’t	
always	have	the	time	to	make	a	well-thought-out	rational	choice	about	a	decision.	Nevertheless,	the	
skeptic	will	insist	that	she	is	targeting	beliefs	that	are	not	sufficiently	epistemically	justified,	even	
though	such	beliefs	may	be	the	result	of	a	boundedly	rational	process.	A	similar	point	can	be	made	
about	instrumentally	rational	beliefs.	While	it	may	be	instrumentally	rational	to	dogmatically	hold	on	
to	certain	beliefs,	it	is	not	epistemically	rational	to	do	so.	The	psychological	costs	associated	with	
																																								 																				
32	For	this	objection,	see	Nick	Hughes’s	forthcoming	paper,	“Evidence	and	Bias”.	
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giving	up	such	beliefs	may	be	brutal,	but	this	does	not	make	the	belief	rational	in	an	epistemic	sense.	
Thus,	this	line	of	response	does	nothing	to	escape	the	skeptic’s	clutches.		
A	finally	worry	about	my	argument	is	that	it	is	self-defeating.	After	all,	haven’t	I	attempted	to	
convince	you	to	endorse	my	skeptical	conclusion	through	rational	argument?	If	so,	then	shouldn’t	
we	doubt	whether	we	know	this	conclusion?		
As	a	skeptic,	I	am	willing	to	admit	that	we	do	not	know	the	conclusion	of	my	argument.	It	is	likely	
that	philosophical	argumentation	is	subject	to	various	epistemic	vices	and	cognitive	biases,	just	as	
political	reasoning,	moral	thinking,	and	religious	belief	are	subject	to	these	biases.	However,	to	say	
that	we	do	not	know	my	conclusion	is	not	to	say	that	we	do	know	that	it	is	false.	Rather,	we	are	
simply	left	uncertain	(or	at	least	lacking	knowledge)	as	to	whether	the	beliefs	that	are	the	product	of	
rational	evaluation	are	known	or	justified.	This	is	still	a	skeptical	conclusion.		
Moreover,	this	claim	is	compatible	with	the	idea	that	we	have	some	epistemic	justification	to	believe	
the	conclusion	of	my	argument.	I	need	not	argue	that	beliefs	entirely	lack	justification	when	they	are	
the	product	of	rational	evaluation.	That	is	an	especially	strong	form	of	skepticism	that	would	run	into	
the	self-defeat	problem,	for	the	following	reason:	If	rational	evaluation	is	unjustified	or	unreliable,	
then	the	rational	evaluation	that	‘rational	evaluation	is	unjustified	or	unreliable’	would	itself	be	
unjustified.	But	if	it	were	unjustified,	then	we	have	good	reason	not	to	believe	it	or	trust	it.	Still,	we	
may	throw	the	epistemic	status	of	these	beliefs	into	doubt	without	undermining	their	justification	
entirely.	Thus,	we	may	have	some	epistemic	justification	for	believing	that	my	conclusion	is	true,	but	
without	knowing	that	it	is	true.	Perhaps	we	should	simply	suspend	judgment	on	the	matter.		
Another	way	to	avoid	the	self-defeat	worry,	which	I	do	not	pursue,	is	to	suggest	that	my	skepticism	
about	rational	evaluation	does	not	apply	to	itself.	33	This	would	allow	me	to	escape	the	self-defeat	
worry	by	claiming	that	my	rational	evaluation	about	the	unreliability	of	rational	evaluation	is	not	
itself	unjustified.	However,	going	this	route	would	leave	me	with	the	challenge	of	convincing	you	
that	you	should	take	my	rational	evaluation	to	be	justified.	In	other	words,	my	skeptical	argument	
would	provide	a	defeater	for	most	beliefs	that	are	the	product	of	rational	evaluation,	but	I	would	
provide	a	defeater	for	why	this	argument	applies	to	the	rational	evaluation	of	my	argument.	This	
may	not	be	an	insurmountable	task,	for	I	do	not	claim	that	rational	evaluation	is	always	or	
universally	an	unreliable	process.	Nevertheless,	I	have	argued	that	we	should	very	often	be	worried	
																																								 																				
33	Adam	Elga	(2010:	179-82)	argues	that	self-defeat	objections	can	be	avoided	because,	in	general,	methods	can	be	
exempted	from	self-application.	I	will	not	outline	the	details	of	his	argument	here,	but	the	rough	idea	is	that	self-
exemption	is	not	ad	hoc	or	arbitrary	because,	unless	we	exempt	our	methods	from	self-application,	they	can’t	be	
coherent—that	is,	they	will	give	inconsistent	recommendations	in	possible	cases.	As	Elga	puts	it,	“in	order	to	be	consistent,	
a	fundamental	policy,	rule,	or	method	must	be	dogmatic	with	respect	to	its	own	correctness”	(2010:	185).			
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about	these	biases	influencing	our	judgments;	that	we	do	not	know	exactly	when	we	should	worry;	
and	that	attempting	to	overcome	these	biases	is	often	unhelpful.		
In	summary,	I	have	argued	that	one	of	the	main	lessons	from	the	literature	on	human	psychology	is	
that	we	should	not	trust	ourselves	as	inquirers.	Many	beliefs	that	we	take	to	be	the	product	of	the	
careful	exercise	of	reason	are	likely	biased	and	wrong.	Put	differently,	an	ordinary	but	fundamental	
belief-forming	method	is	much	less	reliable	than	we	thought.	This	gives	rise	to	a	form	of	skepticism	
about	our	rational	capacities.	This	skeptical	argument	challenges	what	Chris	Hookway	calls	“our	
cognitive	instruments”,	since	it	is	generated	by	doubts	about	our	ability	to	engage	in	rational,	
unbiased	evaluation.	Moreover,	it	is	unclear	how	to	develop	techniques	that	will	drive	out	what	John	
Stuart	Mill	called	“the	fogs	which	hide	from	us	our	own	ignorance”	(1984	[1867]:	239).34	Instead	of	
attempting	to	lift	the	fog,	I	have	simply	attempted	to	illuminate	it.		
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